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Abstract
This paper proposes an evaluation of contemporary art works
in light of some of the concepts embedded in Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel’s symbolic stage. My belief is that an analysis
of Hegel’s conditions for the affirmation of art opens the door
to a discussion of contemporary artistic trends, a discussion
that also takes distance from the (perhaps) abused question of
what defines art. Art does more than question itself; art
questions, and challenges, the nature of our perception.
Key Words
contemporary art, end of art, self-consciousness, symbolic
stage
Art is the presentation of the Idea in its sensuous form. In
Georg Wilheml Friedrich Hegel’s system, art, religion, and
philosophy are the three steps of the spirit’s unfolding into
self-consciousness. In his Introductory Lectures on
Aesthetics,[1] Hegel reflects on two central problems in
philosophy of art. First, less interested in judgments of taste
and only in part concerned with what counts as beauty,
Hegel’s analysis placed itself in the debate over what counts as
art, which arguably became one of the central questions in
twentieth century aesthetics. Second, Hegel was interested in
the evolutionary history of art, and in how the sensuous
appearance of the spirit is described by means of the three
different stages of art: the symbolic, the classical, and the
romantic. Finally, Hegel believed that once the spirit has
reached the romantic stage, art itself reaches an end. In the
dialectic of the spirit, art is confined to its sensuous
expression.
Famously, Hegel’s end of art claim was the basis for Arthur
Danto’s “end of art” theory.[2] Formulated in 1985, Danto’s
thesis states that the evolutionary history of art has reached
an end. What reached an end is not the creation of art works,
as basic evidence shows, but the possibility of analyzing art
through evolutionary patterns. Art ended its phase of selfdiscovery, its evolutionary pilgrimage, precisely when it
admitted, more or less happily, that any object, if theoretically
supported, can be art. The work of art triggering this idea was
Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box. Its appearance as an exact plywood
replica of a mere ordinary object topped any prior artistic
endeavors in its ability to ask a very self-conscious question,
the question of what art is, or can be. The Brillo Box brought
Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’s problem of indiscernible
objects to the Stable Gallery in uptown New York in 1964, and
made clear that two identical objects can be different, and
that one can be, in fact, a work of art. In his 1998
reevaluation of the end of art thesis, Danto said his
conclusion, only apparently dreadful, is not the worst
imaginable outcome; on the contrary, if anything, the end of
art is a promise for new movements, more artists, and even
more art works.[3]

Danto’s theory generated much discussion and criticism,
criticism that, in what was probably its most successful
attempt, questioned the very premises of the argument.[4]
This paper shares most of the concerns about the validity of
the end of art argument. Its goal, however, rather than to
rebut Danto’s theory, is to point to something that I take to
be a more promising solution than Danto’s pluralistic
alternative. This alternative, as with most forms of pluralism,
leaves too many questions unanswered. The purpose of this
paper is to show that a better solution to pluralism can be
found in a reconsideration of what is usually an underrated
component of Hegel’s aesthetic, namely, the symbolic phase.
Although art reaches its apex in classical art and its end in
romantic art, an analysis of the initial stage, symbolic art, can
become the standpoint for a re-evaluation of the end of art
claim. More ambitiously, it can also become the standpoint
from which to contemplate a new direction or horizon in the
history of art. I argue that some of the elements and concepts
embedded in the symbolic phase are at the center of
contemporary artistic production, and that because of these
components, art has either revived or has never ended at all.
The first part of this paper offers a historical clarification of
what Hegel meant by symbol and of the features of the
symbolic we need to account for. It then moves to a brief
analysis of the concept of ‘the end of art’ and of the
differences between Danto’s and Hegel’s accounts. Finally, it
considers a number of contemporary art works that, I believe,
find their conceptual strength in the appropriation and further
elaboration of the concepts related to the symbolic phase.
Section 3. Contemporary symbolism will ultimately lead to an
analysis of the new perspectives that art is proposing and
creating. The apparent pluralism of art has a common
denominator. The problem, as it will turn out, is not that art is
asking a question of itself; it is that art is asking its viewers to
start questioning.
1. The symbolic stage
Hegel’s approach to art, or, more specifically, to the study of
fine arts, is not limited to the construction of an evolutionary
history of art. Art, in its unfolding and in its definition, is a
functional element in the rational and dialectical system that
has as its purpose the affirmation of the Spirit’s selfconsciousness, of Spirit going back to itself. Art, followed by
religion and philosophy, marks the first differentiation of
Spirit: a differentiation from nature. Hegel’s claim, hinted at in
his criticism of Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics, is that art is an
entirely human product, a product going beyond nature, and
able to disclose human consciousness.
To understand the importance of the symbolic stage we cannot
simply analyze the symbolic as a historical phase, nor can we
limit the analysis to a consideration of symbolic art works.
Simply cataloging different arts as pertaining to the symbolic
or to other stages would not do justice to the systematic
nature of Hegel’s work. Nor would such an analysis help the
understanding of one of the points I aim to show, namely, the
relevance of the conceptual meaning that the symbol
embodies aside from its presence at a particular stage in the
history of art.

It might be easier to explain what the symbol is not, to start
with its negative description. Hegel introduces the symbol as
standing in a negative relation with the sign: the symbol is
not a sign. In Hegel’s philosophy the sign is arbitrarily
connected to a meaning. The connection with meaning is not
based on any physical or actual resemblance between the sign
and what is signified. For instance, a flag is a sign, even
though its meaning is detached from the physical nation it
represents. On the contrary, the symbol is analogical; its
meaning is connected to the immediate appearance of
externality. The lion, as a symbol, is tied to the immediate
intuition of strength and power.
Based on a particular concrete entity, the symbol, according to
Hegel, is also able to refer to something outside itself, to look
beyond its own material constraints. In so doing, however,
the externality of the symbol is exceeded, thus opening the
symbol to the abstract and indeterminate. The symbol
engages in a transforming activity with nature, and yet it
cannot properly signify anything without it. The symbol
depends on its own attachment to what it is simultaneously
trying to differentiate itself from.
The symbol’s inherent inability to fully detach itself from
nature affects the presentation of Spirit. The symbolic stage is
described obscurely, with exaggeration and tension between
the internal realization of the Spirit and the external world.
Hegel’s purpose was to present contrast, a negative first step
in the evolution of the spirit and of consciousness. This
contrast hinders the symbolic phase from a harmonic and
balanced presentation of content and form, an achievement
that art will only reach in the classical stage.
It is in light of the contrast embodied by the symbol that the
three stages of symbolic art should be analyzed. Initially, in
the prehistoric period, art is still not visible. As already
mentioned, art exists as a human product, but in order to be a
human product it has to become a conscious activity. The
shaping of artistic consciousness runs parallel with the shaping
of humanity. It follows that the symbolic emerges when
people become witnesses of their own capacity to transform
concrete reality, to interpret and translate it. The material of
this initial shaping and research is nature. Yet in the first
movement of the symbolic stage, unconscious symbolism,
nature and spirit are presented in immediate unity: there is
no substantial differentiation. The attempts to modify nature
are relegated to the quantitative dimension, and include
figures with multiple limbs, heads, etc., changes that do not,
according to Hegel, address the qualitative difference of art
over nature.
It is only in the following stage, the sublime stage, that the
difference is understood as qualitative, as seeking for a
separate level of spirituality. What was only suggested in the
unconscious stage is now looking for a realization. Sublime
symbolism is characterized by the emergence, on the negative
background of immediate, unconscious symbolism, of a form
of creativity. Egyptian art and architecture are the frame for
successive stages in the evolution of art. The sublime is still
immersed in concreteness, but it can now host inner
spirituality. The Pyramids, the symbol of symbols, are the

most suitable example of this point. What makes the Pyramids
the acme of the symbolic phase is their capacity to understand
the presence of spirituality: they literally contain spirituality,
thus becoming a “temple” for it.
However, Judaic art, the last stage of the symbolic, shows how
the balance achieved in Egyptian art is only precarious.
Despite its spiritual content, Judaic art remains within the
boundaries of abstract representation. It is this abstraction
and its failure in representing spirituality that marks the end of
the symbolic.
The three stages of the symbolic represent different levels of
incompleteness in which the spirit has not yet achieved its
sensuous appearance and is, for this reason, deficient. The
deficiency and ambiguity of the symbolic stage diminish its
importance, and lead attention to future stages of art and to
their role in the unfolding of spirit. Yet the relevance of the
symbolic phase resides in being not only the first stage in the
evolutionary history of art, but also the first stage in the
overall presentation of the spirit. As Kathleen Dow Magnus
emphasizes:
Precisely because these symbolic forms
correspond only partially to the idea of spirit,
they grant spirit the unique occasion of
experiencing itself in a form through which it
cannot think. Through its various acts of
symbolization, the thought that will later “think
itself thinking” gains the experience of thinking
itself not thinking.[5]
In other words, the symbolic phase is the first phase in which
spirit, despite not being able to engage in self-investigation,
recognizes the necessity of such a process. The symbolic
stage affirms itself through its own alienation. Symbolic art
reflects on what is missing, on the presence of discrepancies,
and on the need to resolve them.
Classical art comes as a response to this alienation. It has to
establish an equilibrium between content and form, the lack of
which had been highlighted by its predecessor. Given Hegel’s
attention to the contrast between nature and what humanity
can create, the equilibrium will inevitably be marked by the
preeminence of the human element, and by what is,
contingently, the triumph of the human body. Classical
sculpture, the peak of artistic expression, is able to grasp the
right kind of symbolization, a symbolization that invests the
body with human significance. Classical art is sensuous in the
sense of the corporeal, in its perfect harmony with the human
body.
The balance of form and content found in classical art is
disrupted by a new turn. Whereas in the initial stages the
challenge was to find the most suitable sensuous
representation of spirit, the romantic stage is characterized by
questioning whether sensuous appearance is sufficient for the
self-discovery of spirit. The transition to romantic art
becomes a reflection on this last incongruity, spirit’s need to
abandon the constraint of artistic form for the sake of its own
revelation. The religious content of romantic art suggests a
different kind of internalization that is not satisfied by the

forms of classical art or, at this point, by art in general. As
classical art was a symbol of the highest achievement of art,
romantic art is a symbol of its limit.
The symbolic can be viewed as a paradigm for the “limited”
nature of art. What is expressed at the level of the symbolic
can be magnified and applied to art in general. In Hegel’s
system, art is symbolic in reference to religion and philosophy
and, ultimately, in reference to the self-conscious journey of
spirit. Art is intrinsically and unavoidably two-sided. On the
one hand, art strikes us in its immediate, physical presence,
while on the other, its physical presence, as seen in the
description of the symbol, directs us toward a meaning that
goes beyond its tangible physicality. The dual nature of art is
carried from the symbolic to the romantic, and it will, in this
last stage, lead to the end of art. Art ends because of its
inability to extend its function from the revelation of the
sensuous form to the next steps the spirit has to perform.
This is the Hegelian end of art, and yet, as this paper aims to
show, contemporary art points to the fact that there is no
conclusion, final response, or sublimation of these questions
into a separate non-artistic stage. The questions provoked by
the symbolic are visible in the unfolding of art in general, from
its beginning to the art works populating the contemporary
scene.
With this intuition in mind and with a certain hope for the
continuation of art, it is worth analyzing the similarities and
differences between Hegel and Danto’s end of art thesis. For
art to affirm that its continuation is, in fact, a part of its very
nature, a nature exemplified by the features of the symbolic, it
has to confront not one, but two theoretical deaths.
2. The end of art
The symbolic stage is a paradigm of the tendency toward selfinterrogation that characterizes art per se. The symbolic
shows how the materiality intrinsic to art can never fully
represent spirit, thus pointing to its later end. Yet, the
Hegelian “end of art” cannot be assimilated with the
disappearance of a phase. As the symbolic does not cease to
exist in the stages of art that follow, art does not cease to
exist in the evolutionary history of spirit. What verifies this
claim is not the description of art but the dialectical sequence
of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis underlying Hegel’s
philosophical system. The last stage, synthesis, is
characterized by the realization that the synthesis was already
present, in an unaware state, in the thesis. Hegel’s system
does not erase previous steps, and it moves as if to disclose,
through the self-discovery of spirit, what was there all along.
Art, the appearance of spirit in its sensuous form, is a
necessary step without which the synthesis cannot be
achieved.
The idea of art as self-questioning is a crucial component of
philosophy of art, a component that entails the creation and
codification of different art theories. There is a connection,
almost omnipresent in contemporary philosophy of art,
between the questions posed by art, and the theories that
result from these questions, to such an extent that theories
have become the building blocks for the definition of art. This

approach, the necessity of an apparatus of art theories for the
definition of something such as art is at the core of Danto’s
investigation of the evolution of art, and also, importantly for
our purposes, at the basis of the end of art claim.
In Danto, theories are what make us distinguish mere objects
from works of art. Danto’s Artworld includes, together with
artists and art works, the presence of a set of theories,
formulated in a fashion similar to scientific revolutions, that
are not only able to describe an artwork, but that also make of
a work a work of art.
To see something as art requires something the
eye cannot decry—an atmosphere of artistic
theories, a knowledge of the history of art, an
Artworld.[6]
Artistic validity is conceived as a step in a different world, a
bundle of theoretical recognition, a response to the cleavage
between pure, immediate reality and the reality embedded in
art works. Theories also apply contingently; they are tied to
history, and to the historical circumstances surrounding an
artwork. The theory that makes the Brillo Box a work of art is
a theory expressed in a specific moment of the history of the
New York art scene, a theory that follows from previous
periods in the history of art, but also a theory that could not
have been formulated prior to the appearance of the Brillo Box
at the Stable Gallery in 1964.
Together with a connection between art theories and art
works, the Brillo Box and its conceptual justification also carry
with them the reason for Danto’s end of art claim. Warhol,
with his work, intentionally asks a question of a philosophical
nature, a question on what art can be, and he responds, quite
disarmingly, that anything can be a work of art, even
something that, from a representational standpoint, is identical
to a “mere thing.” Beginning with Marcel Duchamp and
eventuating in Warhol, the evolutionary history of art has
reached an end, an end marked by art’s entrance into the
realm of philosophy. The Brillo Box’s existence as a work of
art is indebted to a philosophical justification that stems from
the indiscernibility between art and reality and that, at the
same time, puts art at stake: it confronts it with the question
of its own definition. There is no response to this question;
when art asks itself what art can be, it has reached the
theoretical awareness of the need of a philosophical shift. The
evolutionary history of art has reached a conclusion or, as
noted by Noël Carroll,[7] a form of narrative closure, and it
has now entered an age of scattered pluralism.
There are several analogies between Danto’s and Hegel’s
theories that go from the emphasis on historicity to the
combination of art and philosophy, to the necessity of ending
art to open philosophical doors of conceptualization. And yet,
when comparing the two we should bear in mind a number of
important differences.
First, Hegel and Danto have distinct conceptual aims. Hegel’s
concern was with art’s functional role. Art is a movement in
the development of spirit and of humanity; its function
depends on its contribution to the unfolding of spirit. In Danto,
far from idealistic ambitions, the focus was narrowed to art

and art works, and to their position and relevance in the
Artworld.
Second, Danto’s analysis is not concerned with the origin of
art. He did not divide art into three stages nor is his account
characterized by evaluative or hierarchical judgments. Danto
showed us how to discriminate between art and mere objects;
his focus was not on how the history of art began but on what
belongs to it. Hegel, instead, began his treatment of fine art
with a negative stage, unconscious symbolism, in which art is
still not art, and moves to the description of later stages in the
light of their contribution to spirit.
Lastly, Hegel and Danto differ in their understanding of the
end of art claim. In Hegel, as we have seen, art ends because
its form cannot represent the religious content of Christianity.
Yet, art retains its definition and function as the revelation of
spirit in sensuous form. For Danto, the problem is not that art
is unable to represent spirituality; the problem is that, after
Warhol, anything can be art. The end of the evolutionary
history of art is based on the fact that art has asked itself
what art is. For Hegel, art does not end because it has asked
itself a question of definition; art ends because it has fulfilled
its historical trajectory. For Danto, art ends because nothing,
or better, anything, defines it.
I briefly summarized a few differences between Hegel and
Danto; these differences are related to the goal of their
analyses and specifically to their approaches to the definition
of art. However, despite their relevance, these differences do
not erase the problem of understanding whether art can or
cannot continue. As mentioned, I do not believe art has ended
nor do I believe in the central role played by the question of
the definition of art; on the contrary, I believe that new
perspectives can be disclosed by contemporary art works,
works that have, so to speak, survived the end of art.
The modest goal of this paper is to analyze these perspectives
through a revision of the symbolic stage and of the concepts
embedded in that stage. I believe that the phase of alienation
embodied by the symbolic, the uncertainty that followed, and
the final search for an investigation of consciousness that is
truly human, and specific to the medium of art, are
constitutive parts of what art communicates. This is not only a
way of reestablishing an active connection and dialogue among
art, theory, and philosophy (there is no reason, after all, to
think that art cannot express philosophical concepts), but also
a way of affirming art’s independence. Art is independent in
its ability to raise questions that are closely connected to the
nature of human beings, from their ability to perceive, to their
own understanding of reality. Let me turn to a set of
examples that, from their relation to the problems raised by
the symbolic stage, can be looked at as “symptoms” of the
continuation of art. These works are able to show how certain
questions, contrary to the question of the definition of art, can
still be viewed as functioning parameters in the understanding
of the artworld.
3. Contemporary symbolism
The symbolic stage, in Hegel’s analysis, is described as a
phase of alienation, as the negative stage in which art, a

human creation, battles with the constraints of nature. The
symbolic verges toward exaggeration in its attempts to find a
balance of form and content and ends, in its last stage, with
the realization of the necessity of turning inward to fully
represent the nature of reality and human beings, a
representation it cannot achieve. These questions, the conflict
between human products and nature, the alterations of reality,
and finally the attention toward self-consciousness and selfinvestigation are still on the agenda of contemporary art and
of those works that, at least chronologically, have survived the
end of art. What characterizes these questions is their ability
to belong to art in itself and not to a specific stage in the
history of art. Being intrinsic to the nature of artistic creation,
they are largely independent of the historical and evolutionary
unfolding of art, and in this sense also immune to the end of
art thesis.
My decision to select these three questions is based on their
presence in Hegel’s analysis, and on the possibility of isolating
potential responses in the contemporary panorama. Even if
these might not be the only questions intrinsic to the nature of
art, my point remains unaltered: there are elements of art,
and questions asked by art that are independent of a linear
evolutionary history of art,[8] and that, because of their
independence, escape the risk implied in an end of art.
Danto’s end of art thesis is based on the presence, in the
history of art, of the philosophical question concerning the
definition of art. Yet this is not the only question asked by art;
in fact, it might not even be the most pressing one.
The first question to be analyzed concerns the relation
between art works and nature. In particular, I am interested
in the extent to which the modification of nature and public
spaces is able to construct a new sphere, something that,
along the lines of the symbolic, can build a temple for meaning
by playing with the concreteness of material and of what
surrounds the places considered. Secondly, I will analyze the
impact of the element of distortion in its quantitative and
qualitative senses. Specifically, I will focus on the perceptual
and cognitive effects triggered by distortions and alterations.
The last example deals with the contrasting relation between
the dissolution of concrete materiality and the presence of a
different set of concepts stemming from a consideration of
self-consciousness. My analysis of the conceptual meaning of
the symbolic in contemporary art closely follows the steps
outlined by Hegel, from his questions to the movements
detected in the unfolding of the symbolic. At the same time I
point to the differences and new routes that can be observed
today.
3.1. Nature and earthworks
Spiral Jetty, Robert Smithson’s work in Utah’s Great Salt Lake,
has emerged only a few times since its construction in 1970
when the lake’s water level was especially low. Built of
crystals, salt, and other lake sediments, the work is probably
one of the most effective examples of land art, an earthwork.
Land art echoes minimalism in its representational simplicity
as well as in the choice of materials while, at the same time,
polemically rejecting the institutionalization of art. Works of
land art are not only oftentimes too large or too inaccessible

to be moved to a museum, but they are also impossible to
preserve in a collection because of their material components.
Land art reinforces a close connection between art and
nature, a connection in which the two act upon each other.
The installation emerges from nature; it is made of natural
components, and yet it is bound to disappear because of the
very same reasons. Spiral Jetty will return to nature because
it is, in its very artistic status, part of it.[9]
In the construction of earthworks we can observe the two
movements of unconscious symbolism. On the one hand,
nature is recognized as a state from which art can evolve,
something human beings have the ability to alter. The
modification of nature is the product of the recognition that
nature can become an artifact. On the other hand, as in the
symbolic stage, the construction cannot truly abandon its
material component. If art remains tied to nature, the
progress of nature will “submerge” the art work. An important
feature of the symbolic is the difficulty of distinguishing art
from nature. In the same fashion, earthworks belong to
nature in their way of supporting their own existence on the
site. They are an alteration, but an alteration that shares the
same spatial and temporal constraints of nature; they are
never formally dissociated.
It is interesting to recall, on this point, another Hegelian
feature of symbolism. Hegel describes the first phase of the
symbolic—unconscious symbolism—as something that is not
yet art. Unconscious symbolism lacks a conscious component;
more specifically, it is not self-conscious. Smithson gets to the
same conclusion, but following an opposite route. He turns
Hegel upside down by emphasizing how, precisely when his
creation realizes its existence, what we might want to address
as its self-conscious nature, it ceases to exist and sinks back
into nature, the victim of its own entropic power. Reflecting
his deep awareness of Hegel’s philosophy, Spiral Jetty is
Smithson’s response to the question of the relationship
between art and nature, the first question posed by the
symbolic stage. His response is that the encounter of art and
nature should not be phrased as a struggle for differentiation
but as a connection abetting the final blending or reunion of
the two.
In his analysis of Smithson, Gary Shapiro[10] condensed the
questions that can be asked about the artist’s production into
one: “Where are the art works?” Smithson’s works are not
there, and yet they have never left. They have become the
symbol of a connection, and a contrast that is always in place.
In their relationship to nature, earthworks keep going back to
what Hegel saw as the initial differentiation of art and nature
but with a great difference. Smithson’s works accept their own
incapacity to distinguish themselves from nature; they take
the alienation of the symbolic as a stance, and in so doing
they remain self-questioning.
3.2. Exaggerating
The second feature of the symbolic I want to analyze, and
with it a second question characterizing art works, is the
Hegelian reference to quantitative exaggeration. The symbolic
is at this point aware of its power to create, yet its willingness
to affirm this power is affected by exaggeration, distortions, or

superfluous additions. The symbolic is trying but, in a sense,
it is trying too hard, its energies wasted in the creation of
something still far from the desired equilibrium. The excesses
of the symbolic are symptomatic of its attempts to modify
materiality, and yet the modifications taking place at this point
are not qualitative but exclusively quantitative. Instead of
separating itself from its material element, the second stage of
the symbolic multiplies it to the point of finding itself trapped
in it. Hegel’s classification and description of this phase does
not come without an evaluative judgment. The figures
represented, so quantitatively distorted, are, according to him,
horrific, repugnant, grotesque. And yet, his judgment
originates from a conception of harmonic beauty as the
privileged standard by which to evaluate the quality of a work,
a conception that can hardly be endorsed. Not only can art be
ugly; distortions can convey meaning and encourage further
reflection. In being repugnant, grotesque, or fascinating and
enchanting, quantitative distortions can become qualitative.
David LaChapelle’s photography in Hotel LaChapelle and in his
other numerous works gravitates around these tenets. From
his first photographs, for Warhol’s Interview Magazine, to his
glossy portraits of celebrities for fashion magazines,
exaggeration has been the trademark of LaChapelle’s work. His
photos are larger-than-life exposures of sculpted bodies, the
bodies of celebrities such as Paris Hilton, who are even too
well known. LaChapelle’s photos are glossy and deeply
unpleasant. Colors are over-saturated, the set clogged and
surreal at the same time, and yet there is something
inherently vulgar in his work that translates into social
criticism and ultimately into self-criticism. Quantitative
distortions are qualitative statements, a commentary on what
photography is depicting, can depict, or, as it is legitimate to
suggest, is commanded to depict.
Hegel does see in quantitative distortions a positive or selfcritical feature of art, and he does not altogether condemn
grandiose exaggerations. As mentioned earlier, the balance of
quantitative and qualitative distortions, the highest expression
of the symbolic, is found in the Pyramids’ capacity to host, in
their disproportionate size, an equally disproportionate
spirituality.
Contemporary art responds to the question posed by the
“symbol of symbols” with symbols that are either too small or
too large. Richard Serra’s production is an example of the
latter. Possibly one of the most fervent advocates of
minimalism of forms and materials, Serra creates giant, selfstanding sculptures made of rusting steel or other oxidized
metals. Some of his projects, such as Tilted Arc, were public
installations. The Arc was installed in 1981 in New York’s
Federal Plaza with the purpose of revitalizing the otherwise
dreadful look of the square, and yet, Serra’s intentions had
little to contribute with a somewhat simplistic amelioration of a
public space:
I do not make portable objects. I do not make
works that can be relocated or site adjusted. I
make works that deal with the environmental
components of given places. The scale, size and
location of my site-specific works are determined

by the topography of the site, whether it be
urban, landscape, or an architectural enclosure.
My works become part of and are built into the
structure of the site, and they often restructure,
both conceptually and perceptually, the
organization of the site.
My sculptures are not objects for the viewer to
stop and stare at. The historical purpose of
placing sculpture on a pedestal was to establish a
separation between the sculpture and the viewer.
I am interested in creating a behavioral space in
which the viewer interacts with the sculpture in
its context. (Italics mine.)[11]
Pyramids and Tilted Arc are perceptual symbols. They both
refer to a specific historical and social context, and they both
carry a distinct intrinsic meaning. In the Pyramids, the
meaning is a form of spirituality that blends with religion,
while in Tilted Arc, the meaning is an internalization of the
perceptual space characterized by the encounter between “my”
perception and the barrier imposed by the sculpture on the
site.
Serra’s work was at the center of a trial that ended with the
destruction of the work.[12] The Arc was considered to be an
obtrusive and parasitic element by the people working in the
square, a distortion of the previous design of the plaza. Yet,
this very criticism recalls another feature of the symbolic: the
ability to evoke something that goes beyond immediate
appearance. Gregg Horowitz[13] noted how many of the
depositions against Serra’s work tended to emphasize the
beauty of the square, a beauty that the installation should
have improved by making the square a relaxing space for
people working all day in windowless offices. However,
remembering Federal Plaza as an idyllic space is delusional.
Tilted Arc reminded people of its undeveloped potential, of
what in their dreams the plaza could have been but was not.
Tilted Arc made people think about the necessity of something
that never existed in the plaza, the desire for something
beyond the material existence of the surroundings. The work
became, for those employed in the area, a way of
rediscovering their own perception and sensibility; it made the
public self-conscious of its condition. Materiality and
externality can become human once they assume symbolic
significance. Contemporary art can again respond with an
affirmation of what, in Hegel’s understanding of the symbolic,
was an obstacle.
3.3. No more works of art
In the last stage of symbolism, the spiritual content of the
works exceeds the available art form. This, for Hegel, is the
end of the symbolic stage, a stage bound to material
concreteness and formal abstractness. It is also, on a larger
scale, the reason for the end of art: art is limited to sensuous
appearance, and once it realizes its tendency toward
spirituality, it shows its inability to embody it.
Contemporary art, however, seems provocatively capable of
existing even without the presence of a material object,
substituting materiality with what is, in the end, only a

thought. By eliminating the materiality of the object, art has
condensed its critical message to the conceptual or, as in Tino
Sehgal’s work, to situations.
From Welcome to the Situation (2006) to his latest project,
The Associations (2012),[14] Sehgal has deprived art of any
corporeality, from its physical permanence, to its commercial
value (how do you buy a work that does not exist?), to
somewhat paradoxically the possibility of being physically
observed. Hans Ulrich Obrist, the co-director of the
Serpentine Gallery in London, (and also an artist famous for
his “eventful” interviews),[15] has defined Sehgal’s works as
“living sculptures.” The meaning of ‘living’ is in this case quite
straightforward: Sehgal’s installations are acted by living
people and, in order to be appreciated, they require the
audience to be physically present. Recordings are banned.
Sehgal does not provide written instructions for his
performances, leaving ample margin for what is not
improvisation but simply a form of respect and fascination for
what can naturally happen. In The Associations, seventy
interpreters, both dancers and civilians, were asked to
approach the visitors in the Turbine Hall at the Tate Gallery,
invite them to say something, and then translate it into
another language. The encounter involved a form of physical
interaction; whether dancing, or simply walking, visitors and
performers had to “associate” and to make a translation of
that association. More than a language translation, Sehgal
wanted it to become an appropriation of something internal to
the visitor, thus having the visitor and the translator associate
in a space that began swirling with encounters.
And yet, as I mentioned earlier, nothing, not even a recording,
remained of a performance whose instructions were only
verbal. In Sehgal, the “sensuous appearance” of art is only
temporary, transient, and it is substituted by its
disappearance. Forcefully oblivious of their tendency toward
dissolution, his works remain permanent. Sehgal’s
performances negate the end of art in placing themselves
precisely where art was supposed to end. Sehgal shows, quite
simply, how there can be art in the absence of any physical
object.
Hegel’s conclusion of the symbolic stage and his end of art
theory are based on the belief that art has completed its
function, the revelation of the spirit in its sensuous form. For
spirit to move further into self-consciousness, into its full
disclosure, it has to abandon art and its relation to what is
material and concrete. Other artists in conceptual and
performance art, but Sehgal in a very radical fashion, are
capable of showing how art can not only absorb the tension
between materiality and spirituality but also sublimate this
tension and accept an existence that is in no way sensory.
Contemporary art embraces the problems raised by the
symbolic, the problems that led to the dissolution of art, and
responds by accepting dissolution as an artistic statement. Art
does not need to transition into philosophy nor does it become
philosophy from having asked a question over its definition.
What art does now is play with materiality, with its presence
and absence, and with the perspectives that can be disclosed
from this very interrogation.

4. An old idea for a new chapter of art
The works I have presented point to the presence in
contemporary art of questions that originate in the symbolic
stage, and that are still today characteristic of the creation and
analysis of art. What I want to highlight is that these
questions not only escape the end of art but also a system
according to which art can only be viewed as the product of a
linear evolutionary history whose guiding thread is the issue of
what art is. Responding to the question of what comprises art
is not and should not be considered the only goal of art. Art
poses questions that touch on other philosophical and nonphilosophical issues. Among them, and I think prominently in
the examples I have offered, are the cognitive and perceptual
impact of art works, as well as our role as collaborators,
participants, and questioners.
The symbolic provides a basis for this investigation, an
investigation that, by restating the questions of the symbolic,
remains open to the responses that art can provide. This
openness is not for the purpose of reaching an end nor is it an
affirmation of pluralism. Even if we admit that new questions
can be raised, we also have to admit that other questions, as
in this case, the ones raised by the symbolic, are embedded in
the creation and appreciation of art.
In my analysis, I isolated three questions that art has been
asking independently of its stage in evolution and
independently of what defines art: a question over its relation
to nature, a question over the modifications of materiality, and
the question of whether art can exist if deprived of materiality.
Responding to these questions, challenging previous
responses, and disclosing new perspectives are essential steps
to building the texture of a discipline that need not face
dissolution.
There is a final element I want to highlight, an element that is
common to the three questions posed by the symbolic and
that closely relates to Hegel’s philosophy: the relation
between art and the revelation and disclosure of human
consciousness. In Hegel’s view, art explored the sensuous
appearance of consciousness. Contemporary art responds with
an analysis of perception and the perceptual consciousness of
the beholders. To borrow an expression from the artist Olafur
Eliasson, being the spectator of art implies “seeing yourself
seeing.”[16] When compared to philosophy, art might be at a
disadvantage from its inability to propositionally articulate
concepts. And yet art has a tremendous advantage in its
capacity to use perception as a tool to discover new ways of
expressing self-consciousness. Art can coexist with
philosophy; it has a heuristic value in instructing human
beings about their own perception, an essential feature of selfconsciousness. Reflecting on the symbolic stage, the oldest
and least refined phase of art, can make us consider a value
that art has never lost and will likely never lose.
Contemporary art reflects on what in the symbolic is the first
affirmation of the self-consciousness of humanity by reevoking our sensuous, perceptual abilities. This is a question
about the nature of who we are and to which it is much harder
to respond.
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